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Abstract: 
 
With a long history of oil and gas production and potentially significant reserves of unconventional 
gas, Scotland represents a notable case amid the growing international controversy over 
unconventional gas development (UGD). This article applies argumentative discourse analysis to the 
Scottish debate over UGD and identifies several important storylines which have mobilised different 
discourse coalitions and shaped public opinion as well as policy-making. For now, anti-UGD storylines 
appear more encompassing and have achieved greater resonance. Of particular interest, however, is 
the role of the Scottish government as a third discourse coalition. Through a moratorium on all forms 
of UGD and a cautious 'evidence-based approach', the government has established a form of 
discursive dominance and has successfully minimised electoral risks. But its anti-Westminster 
storyline - created in the run-up to the Scottish independence referendum in 2014 - has undermined 
the government's pragmatic strategy by invoking Scottish resistance to the UK’s pursuit of shale gas. 
While the evidence-based approach persists as the preeminent storyline, its interpretation has 
'drifted' from (1) a modestly reformed planning policy to (2) an exercise in scientific fact-finding 
combined with a public consultation and, arguably, (3) to a precautionary approach that might lay 
the foundation for an extended moratorium. 
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Introduction 
 
Ever since US shale gas production accelerated in the mid-2000s, unconventional gas development 
(UGD) has grown into a major political controversy in many countries. The US has witnessed 
increasing mobilisation against hydraulic fracturing (or ‘fracking’) of shale gas wells. In Europe, a 
number of countries have imposed indefinite or temporary moratoria on shale gas: Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands. 
 
In the UK, former Prime Minister Cameron announced in January 2014 that the country was going 
“all out for shale” (Guardian, 13 January 2014). Anti-UGD mobilisation across the country has not 
weakened the UK government’s resolve, but it has led to moratoria by the devolved regional 
governments in Scotland and Wales. In Scotland, the first application to drill for coalbed methane 
was made in 2011. A 2014 report by the British Geological Survey found potentially lucrative reserves 
2 
 
of unconventional gas throughout Scotland’s ‘central belt’ region [50]. But the Scottish government 
(constituted by the Scottish National Party (SNP)) imposed a moratorium on shale gas and coalbed 
methane (CBM) in January 2015, and on underground coal gasification (UCG) in October 2015, by 
suspending all relevant planning applications. The government has ordered several impact 
assessments on public health, transport, the economy, and climate change as well as further 
scientific studies on decommissioning, seismic activity, and monitoring. A public consultation during 
winter 2016/17 will follow and a decision on shale gas and CBM may be due by summer 2017.1 
 
Scotland represents an interesting test case for UGD. The country is marked by a long history of oil 
and gas production, but many offshore fields are now depleted and profitability is falling. Two very 
different visions of Scotland’s energy future are being propagated. The pro-UGD camp hails the new 
unconventional onshore reserves as partly compensating for the rapid decline of offshore 
production. It calls for a realistic energy policy and a more gradual low-carbon transition [23], citing 
scientific reports that highlight potential opportunities and judge the risk to public health and 
environment as relatively low [67,57]. The anti-UGD camp deploys a zero-sum narrative in favour of a 
country powered by 100 percent renewable energy [75] and promotes a phase-out of fossil fuels and 
the gradual winding down of a fossil fuel-based petrochemical industry [49]. 
 
While there are similarities with UGD-related discourse and regulatory dynamics in other contexts – 
particularly with England, the Netherlands, and New York State – the Scottish case also has 
distinctive characteristics. The central belt region has witnessed simultaneous controversies over all 
three forms of unconventional gas. Furthermore, the debate has been decisively shaped by the 
government’s insistence on an evidence-based approach and by the Scottish independence 
referendum (September 2014), giving rise to partially distinct political and discursive dynamics. 
 
This article employs a discursive approach – based on Hajer’s argumentative discourse analysis [34] – 
to examine the debate over UGD in Scotland. Hajer ([35]: 67) defines discourse as “an ensemble of 
ideas, concepts, and categories through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, 
and which is produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices.” While material 
resources and political networks markedly shape political outcomes, the power of actors is also “at 
least in part discursive” ([52]: 169). Rhetorical skills and persuasive storylines significantly influence 
both the wider public and policy-makers.  
 
Industry and other pro-UGD actors deploy a variety of storylines, while opponents work to 
undermine these with their own narrative schemes. “Linkages with prevailing societal discourses” 
(ibid.), often described as ‘resonance’, can translate into considerable discursive power. For instance, 
such is the narrative force of the ‘renewables revolution’ that the pro-UGD camp is working hard to 
dispel the image of UGD as “a throwback to the bad old days” of heavy industry [23]. 
 
Discourse and argumentation are central because political actors cannot stand aside from discursive 
battles. Actors’ understanding of the policy problem itself, as well as its solutions, has been 
discursively constructed over many years. Their interests are, at least to some extent, “incomplete, 
ambiguous, and shaped by contingent discourses in which they are embedded” ([68]: 1882). Which 
storylines resonate and can decisively empower pro- or anti-UGD coalitions is a matter of contextual, 
empirical analysis.  
 
This article thus pursues two main objectives. First, it analyses the narratives (or ‘storylines’) of three 
different actor coalitions in significant detail and contributes to a comprehensive understanding of 
the Scottish debate on UGD. Second, it elucidates the evolution of the debate – particularly the 
‘discursive drift’ of the Scottish government’s narrative from hesitation to discursive dominance (the 
‘evidence-based approach’) and, more recently, to precautionary scepticism. Although the 
                                                          
1
 The moratorium on UCG followed a separate timetable and was made permanent on 6 October 2016. 
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government’s cautious and evidence-based approach continues to exert discursive dominance, this 
will likely be a temporary state of affairs. 
 
 
Context and Methods 
 
The current regulatory framework for UGD in the UK relies on multiple levels of governance and 
different regulatory authorities [11]. Companies have to purchase a time-limited exploration and 
development license for a particular area from the UK government. Before they can start to drill test 
wells, authorisation is required from the UK government’s Department for Business, Energy, and 
Industrial Strategy, the Health and Safety Executive, and the Coal Authority (for CBM and UCG). 
Further necessary permissions have been devolved to the Scottish level and must be obtained from 
the local authority and the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency. The Scottish government 
issued a revised planning policy in June 2014 to stipulate public consultation, risk assessments, and 
appropriate buffer zones for shale gas and CBM. Moreover, the UK will soon devolve both licensing 
and mineral access rights for onshore oil and gas extraction to Scotland [62]. The issue of access 
rights had become controversial after the UK government’s decision to change trespass rules and 
allow drilling at 300m or more under privately owned land. 
 
As one of the first studies to examine the Scottish debate over unconventional natural gas 
development, this article draws on insights from existing discursive analyses of energy controversies 
[9,53,60]. Given the dearth of secondary material on Scottish UGD, extensive media and 
documentary analysis as well as semi-structured interviews represent the main empirical sources. 
Numerous reports by and statements given to UK broadsheets (Guardian, The Times), news websites 
(BBC News, Scottish Energy News), and Scottish newspapers (Courier, Daily Record, Falkirk Herald, 
Herald, The National, Scotsman, Sunday Herald) between August 2013 and June 2016 (n=282) were 
analysed – with the help of the LexisNexis database and newspaper online archives, using the search 
strings “shale gas”, “fracking”, and “coal gasification”. Key government documents, records of 
parliamentary debates, and leaflets and pamphlets by pro- and anti-UGD actors were also examined. 
 
Through initial selective sampling as well as snowball sampling, nine semi-structured interviews with 
key actors were conducted (Table 1) to corroborate positions and narratives established by media 
and documentary analysis and to gain deeper insights into political and discursive dynamics. In the 
context of fast-moving political events, statements made in interviews were sometimes guarded and 
indicated possible future revision. Permission was obtained for seven of the interviews to be 
recorded and transcribed.  
 
TABLE 1: Semi-structured interviews with anonymised respondents 
 
Date Placeholder Organisation 
13/04/2015 Interview A Public health expert (academia) 
19/05/2015 Interview B INEOS Upstream 
20/05/2015 Interview C UNISON Scotland (trade union) 
27/05/2015 Interview D Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC) 
01/06/2015 Interview E Senior partner, global law firm 
04/06/2015 Interview F Scottish Environment Link (NGO umbrella group) 
12/06/2015 Interview G National Farmers Union Scotland (NFUS) 
11/08/2016 Interview H Anti-UGD activist, Frack Off Scotland 
28/08/2016 Interview I Anti-UGD activist, Edinburgh 
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The research data was imported into QSR Nvivo software and analysed through a combination of 
deductive and inductive approaches. Emphasis was placed on the ‘template style’ based on a 
preliminary list of codes which were derived from the broader literature [48], namely themes or 
frames uncovered by previous research. However, to counteract the risk of merely confirming the 
results of existing studies on shale gas, inductive openness was maintained and new themes were 
pursued in a second round of coding. Overall, a reflexive and iterative research design ([8]: 26) 
allowed for the identification of relevant patterns, storylines and associated actors (Table 2). 
 
My discourse-analytical approach is informed by the emerging literature on UGD in the UK and other 
countries. Cotton et al. [17] provide a pioneering discursive analysis of the UK debate over shale gas 
and Metze [46] examines “framing contests” in the Dutch debate. Cotton [15] uses Q-methodology 
to identify specific areas of agreement and contestation. Bomberg [7] undertakes a systematic 
content analysis of UK media frames, assesses their potential effectiveness (or resonance), and 
detects a “growing dominance of more parochial frames” over broader national or global discourses 
regarding the economy or climate change. Hilson [39] evaluates the limited legal relevance of such 
global frames in England’s planning and regulatory procedures. Williams et al. [74] scrutinise 
discourses of risk, while Jaspal and Nerlich [43] and Upham et al. [72] adopt a social representations 
perspective to explore how hydraulic fracturing is constructed by the media and how it is perceived 
by citizens. 
 
Ashmoore et al. [1] apply a similar method to examine newspaper coverage in three US states, 
whereas Blair et al. [6] focus on media coverage in Colorado and highlight the importance of 
uncertainty for framing shale gas. Dodge and Lee [19] explain policy gridlock on fracking in New York 
State through the absence of a “shared discursive space”. Comparative research is also beginning to 
emerge. Metze and Dodge [47] examine policy dynamics in New York State and the Netherlands, 
while Goldthau and Sovacool [33] analyse interpretive frames in Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania. 
 
Finally, a growing number of writings address UK policy-making. Cairney et al. [11] offer a 
comprehensive account of UK policy dynamics and interest group formation. They apply the 
advocacy coalition framework to show how actor coalitions exchange information in order to reduce 
both political and scientific uncertainty. Hays et al. [38] scrutinise the quality and extent of scientific 
knowledge about hydraulic fracturing technology, while Hawkins [37] evaluates the robustness of 
England’s regulatory system for fracking. 
 
Although there is some overlap of discursive methods with policy and institutionalist analyses, 
Hajer’s argumentative discourse analysis (ADA) places an even stronger emphasis on the vague and 
flexible nature of coalitions as well as on discursive strategies of problem definition and persuasion 
[34,26]. Such divergent interpretations are not surprising because the political salience of UGD is high 
and the role of scientific expertise is complex. Given that ample “counter expertise” ([26]: 109) is 
often available, scientific knowledge rarely settles political contests in the short term [60]. This 
‘politicised’ appraisal of scientific expertise contrasts with the Scottish government’s ambition for a 
resolutely ‘evidence-based’ approach to UGD. Ultimately, the UGD controversy is a debate about 
moral and political choices which are linked to different interpretations of available scientific 
knowledge [11,21,16,22]. 
 
 
A Discourse-Analytical Approach 
 
Scientific complexity is the starting point for argumentative discourse analysis (ADA). Environmental 
and energy politics are deeply affected by “discursive manipulation” whereby political actors seek to 
play down “measurable indicators”, reduce complexity, and set the political agenda by drawing 
attention to “simplified answers” ([18]: 26). In the Scottish debate, relevant examples include a 
‘balanced energy policy’ or an ‘evidence-based approach’. The latter term is routinely used by the 
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Scottish government and has particular resonance due to the elevated status of scientific knowledge 
in the modern age [73]. The anti- and the pro-UGD coalitions also lay claim to evidence-based 
advocacy, but interpret available scientific studies in different ways. The Scottish government’s 
insistence on an evidence-based approach seeks to bolster its reputation for competent governance, 
while also preserving significant leeway for its eventual decision on UGD.2 Ultimately, however, the 
political case has to be made alongside the scientific case. This explains the planned public 
consultation and the public engagement processes that were conducted by major companies (INEOS 
and Cluff Natural Resources (CNR)). 
 
 
Discursive Hegemony 
 
ADA conceptualises politics “as a struggle for discursive hegemony in which actors try to secure 
support for their definition of reality” ([34]: 59). Achieving discursive hegemony serves to close down 
the debate and establish UGD as a widely accepted technology. However, in the Scottish context, 
given the strength of opposing discourse coalitions, it appears more likely that multiple discourses 
will continue to co-exist [20], leading to either cautious progress on UGD or an indefinite (but 
reversible) moratorium. 
 
If politics is understood as a discursive struggle, it genuinely matters who is able to set the terms of 
the debate, which issues are emphasised, and which ones are deemphasised or excluded. Once 
actors are compelled to use the “ideas, concepts, and categories of a given discourse”, Hajer ([34]: 
60) speaks of ‘discourse structuration’. The discursive dominance of the ‘evidence-based’ approach 
manifests this condition. To radically depart from it and establish a new problem definition carries 
the risk of being perceived as illegitimate or unintelligible. Structuration by itself, however, does not 
guarantee that policy will be shaped by the dominant storyline. The ultimate objective is therefore to 
achieve “discourse institutionalisation” whereby a discourse “solidifies into institutions and 
organizational practices” ([36]: 64). Only once structuration and institutionalisation have both been 
achieved one can speak of discursive hegemony ([34]: 61). 
 
Scotland’s current moratorium on UGD can be regarded as a precarious and temporary 
institutionalisation3 of the cautious, ‘evidence-based’ approach which is routinely proclaimed by the 
Scottish government. The moratorium is publicly endorsed by both pro- and anti-UGD camps, but 
neither regards it as their preferred outcome. This and a likely decision in 2017 mean that this partial 
form of discourse institutionalisation will not last. While the pro-UGD coalition seeks more expansive 
opportunities for test drilling (which is, to a limited extent, allowed under the moratorium) and near-
term UGD on a commercial scale (Interviews B, E), the anti-UGD coalition campaigns for a permanent 
ban or at least a highly restrictive regulatory framework (Interview F). Overall, therefore, discursive 
hegemony does not currently apply. Yet, the government’s discourse and policy are influential and 
command sufficient support to exert a form of discursive dominance. 
 
 
Discursive Power or Resonance 
 
Hajer ([34]: 59) suggests that three factors are particularly important to assess discursive power. 
First, credibility requires that discursive positions are internally consistent and communicated in a 
persuasive manner. The pro-UGD coalition thus emphasises that UK/Scottish operations will be 
models of best practice, while acknowledging that UGD in the US and Australia has been 
insufficiently regulated. Second, acceptability implies that discursive positions are acknowledged as 
                                                          
2
 A similar approach prevailed in New York State for six years until hydraulic fracturing was banned in 
December 2014 ([66]). 
3
 See Bulkeley [9] for a similar example of partial discourse institutionalisation. 
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“attractive or necessary” [ibid.]. Here, the issues of financial benefits for local communities as well as 
narratives of energy security and economic development come into play. Third, trust assumes that 
actors are believed to be truthful – especially regarding potential risks, uncertainties, remedial 
capacity, and motives – and that their past behaviour or procedures provide sufficient evidence. The 
industry cites a programme of local community meetings and exhibitions to demonstrate 
participatory and respectful decision-making (Interview B), but companies such as INEOS have 
experienced turbulent industrial relations in the recent past (Interviews C, D). 
 
Discursive interventions seek to achieve “rhetorical or symbolic resonance with social and cultural 
values and norms, or rekindle older traditions and sentiments” ([18]: 22). Although, over the long 
term, cultural identities, values, and norms are constructed and sustained by discursive practices, 
they are difficult to deconstruct or reinterpret in the short term. The concept of resonance captures 
the ideational fit between such sedimented identities and values, on the one hand, and novel 
discursive interventions on the other. Benford and Snow ([4]: 621) suggest that resonance hinges on 
experiential commensurability and narrative fidelity. Experiential commensurability gauges to what 
extent discursive frames resonate with the lived, everyday experience of the target audience. When 
anti-UGD groups speak of a “toxic nightmare” and paint an image of a “dirty” industry responsible for 
hazardous pollution [25], the public’s cognitive resources include oil- and gas-related accidents in 
Scotland (relatively few and mostly offshore) and global, heavily mediatised examples of fossil fuels 
production, ranging from tar sands in Canada to shale gas incidents and oil spills in the US, and 
coalbed methane in Australia. Adverse events with a clear connection to UGD, even if occurring in 
distant places, can be used to boost negative experiential commensurability.  
 
Narrative fidelity (used interchangeably with cultural resonance) captures the significance of cultural 
traditions and values. UGD can be seen as a logical and beneficial continuation of the Scottish 
tradition of oil and gas production, reaching all the way back to the mid-nineteenth century. Thus, 
pro-UGD actors intermittently attempt to stoke pride in Scottish industrial history, while recasting 
UGD as a bridge to a greener future. Identity-based appeals are woven into arguments about 
economic benefits and energy security, with INEOS [40] declaring that, thanks to UGD, Scotland 
“could play to its strength, securing its position as an energy exporter.” The search for cultural 
resonance with Scotland’s long history of fossil fuel extraction is palpable here. But history can 
equally be represented as catalogue of health and safety disasters linking the Scottish mining 
industry to contemporary petrochemicals ([45], Interview H). In addition, anti-UGD actors portray the 
technology as a diversion from Scotland’s destiny as a pioneer in the global low-carbon energy 
transition, weakening its commitment to ambitious climate and energy targets4 and undermining its 
future as an exporter of cleaner, low-carbon technologies.  
 
 
Storylines and Discourse Coalitions 
 
The above dimensions are central to both anti- and pro-UGD storylines. Storylines are mechanisms 
for “the clustering of knowledge, the positioning of actors, and [… for] the creation of coalitions” 
([34]: 63). At their best, storylines offer a “short, condensed, and often metaphorical expression” 
([68]: 1884) of policy problems and appropriate solutions. An example from UK energy policy is the 
oft-used phrase of ‘keeping the lights on’ which is employed to stress energy security and call into 
question a speedy low-carbon energy transition. It exudes pragmatism, appeals to ‘common sense’, 
and creates an opportunity for discursive closure [34], that is, a stabilisation of the problem 
definition.  
 
                                                          
4
 The 2009 Scottish Climate Change Act commits the government to a 42 percent reduction of GHG emissions 
by 2020 and of 80 percent by 2050 (compared to 1990). A separate target aims at providing 100 percent of 
electricity from renewable sources by 2020. 
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Although often resilient [26], storylines are potentially vulnerable to contestation (Palmer 2010) – be 
it through new empirical evidence, exogenous shocks, or cultural symbols and countervailing 
narratives. The scope and complexity of storylines varies across the literature. In this article, I take 
storylines to represent the discursive frames that support overarching pro- and anti-UGD narratives. 
Storylines serve as the “discursive cement” of discourse coalitions ([34]: 65). These coalitions are 
constituted by actors who consider that their own beliefs and interests are served by one or more 
associated storylines. Importantly, neither beliefs nor interests need to be shared by discourse 
coalitions [9]. Actors sometimes drift in and out of discourse coalitions over time, as illustrated by 
the trade union GMB Scotland [32] which initially subscribed to the Scottish Trade Union Council’s 
critical stance, but later declared its support for UGD. Storylines can also overlap – for instance, 
economic development and energy security are addressed by both pro- and anti-UGD coalitions (see 
Table 2). This may create the foundations for potential compromise and convergence [47], but in 
Scotland the fundamental opposition between two grand narratives – natural gas as a ‘bridge’ fuel 
and the renewables ‘revolution’ – has so far prevented this. 
 
 
TABLE 2: Key storylines and resonant values, goals, and interests 
 
Pro-UGD Anti-UGD Reserved 
Economic development 
(resonates with: secure livelihoods, well-being, wealth) 
 
Energy security 
(resonates with: independence, reliability, affordability) 
 
Reassurance 
(resonates with: scientific authority, socio-
political trust) 
Uncertainty and potential risks 
(resonates with: precaution, mistrust) 
Evidence-based approach 
(resonates with: scientific 
authority, regulatory 
competence, ‘common sense’, 
trust) 
Social and environmental 
responsibility 
(resonates with: global ethics, pragmatism) 
‘Bad governance’ and  
energy justice 
(resonates with: mistrust, inequality, 
exclusion) 
Anti-Westminster 
(resonates with: independence, 
nationalism, responsibility) 
 
Threat to low-carbon energy 
transition 
(resonates with: optimism, 
technological transformation) 
 
 
Membership of Discourse Coalitions 
 
The UGD debate in Scotland plays out as a contest between three discourse coalitions. The pro-UGD 
discourse coalition assembles major industrial players with economic interests in shale gas and 
coalbed methane (INEOS, IGas) and underground coal gasification (Cluff Natural Resources, Five 
Quarter Energy), the industry association UK Onshore Oil & Gas (UKOOG), one large trade union 
(GMB Scotland), the Scientific Alliance (an NGO), the Scottish Conservative Party, and a number of 
academic experts. The anti-UGD discourse coalition includes around 28 local activist organisations 
(Broad Alliance against Unconventional Gas), several Scottish environmental NGOs (Friends of the 
Earth Scotland, WWF Scotland, RSPB Scotland, Scottish Wildlife Trust, Scottish Environment Link), 
some trade unions (UNISON Scotland, Scottish Trade Union Council (STUC)), a few academic experts, 
the Scottish Green Party, the Scottish Labour Party5, and ‘SNP Members Against Unconventional Gas’ 
(SMAUG) - an influential section of the governing Scottish National Party (SNP). 
                                                          
5
 Scottish Labour initially pledged a cautious approach to UGD (incl. binding local referendums), but called for a 
complete ban in the run-up to the Scottish parliamentary elections of May 2016. 
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The third coalition is less congruent and temporary. It mainly consists of the Scottish government 
(plus significant sections of the SNP). In addition, there are numerous organisations which have not 
yet formulated a clear position, but take an interest in UGD and are broadly supportive of a cautious, 
inclusive approach. These comprise, among others, the National Farmers Union Scotland (Interview 
G) and the Church of Scotland [12]. 
 
 
Pro-UGD Storylines 
 
Pro-UGD discourse is focused on instilling a sense of opportunity, on demonstrating tangible benefits 
of unconventional gas, and on downplaying potential risks associated with extraction. The evidence-
based approach of the Scottish government is interpreted as a reliance on sound scientific 
knowledge. UGD technologies are seen as proven, while potential risks are described as contextual 
and site-specific in terms of regulatory frameworks and geology (Interview B). 
 
(1) Economic development and risks 
At the broadest level, UGD is inscribed into the project of rebalancing the economy and boosting 
manufacturing. When used as feedstock, shale gas is needed to manufacture many desirable, ‘high-
value’ consumer products, construction materials, and even innovative materials for wind turbines 
and solar panels (INEOS 2015a). Special emphasis is placed on the accelerated decline of Scotland’s 
North Sea oil and gas production and the closure of most remaining coalmines. UGD is praised for 
compensating for the loss of well-paid jobs and tax revenues [13,40].  
 
For the Grangemouth area alone, INEOS expects that around 6,000-7,000 new jobs could emerge in 
shale gas extraction and the wider supply chain. INEOS has also promised tangible economic benefits 
to affected communities. The company will share 4 percent of shale gas revenues with landowners 
and a further 2 percent with the wider community. Over time, this may generate significant 
economic benefits for local communities, with headlines figures quoted as £375m for a 10m2x10m2 
development area and £2.5bn for the entire project [42]. And if Scotland became a pioneer in UCG 
technology, a CNR-commissioned report projects significant benefits of around £6bn for the Scottish 
economy and nearly 5,000 jobs in extractive and chemicals sectors [5]. 
 
Narratives of opportunity are often accompanied by warnings about the risks of rejecting UGD or 
moving too slowly, especially in comparison to major competitors in the UGD business, such as the 
US and China [71,40]. Initially, INEOS reacted to the prospect of moratorium by warning that its gas 
cracker at Grangemouth would not have a long-term future unless an “indigenous source” could be 
developed (Scotsman, 10 February 2015). After reportedly receiving assurances from the 
government (National, 16 July 2015), the company declared its support for a temporary moratorium 
(National, 29 April 2015). It now maintains that UGD “can help to protect manufacturing and jobs by 
securing competitive […] raw materials” [42]. 
 
Slow decision-making has clearly affected the fortunes of UCG technology. The industry needs 
sufficient investment certainty to finance exploration and extraction. As CNR [14] warned, “[e]ven a 
temporary delay until 2016, and the uncertainties this would cause, would set us back considerably 
(maybe fatally) for the future.” In response to the moratorium on UCG (in October 2015), CNR put on 
hold its Scottish project and shifted its investment elsewhere. Five Quarter Energy even collapsed in 
March 2016. 
 
 
(2) Energy security 
In its broadest form, energy security is concerned with “how to equitably provide available, 
affordable, reliable, efﬁcient, environmentally benign, properly governed and socially acceptable 
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energy services” ([64]: 5344). In the UGD debate, however, it is usually more narrowly linked to 
security of gas supplies and affordable energy prices. The Scottish Conservatives insist that 
“increasing the domestic supply of gas is bound to have a beneficial impact on energy prices” ([58]: 
30632). However, most pro-UGD actors now play down this argument because the integrated nature 
of European and global markets for natural gas will likely act as a price equaliser. 
 
With regard to security of supply, much is made of the projection that the UK’s dependence on 
imports of natural gas (from often politically unstable countries) will likely rise to more than two 
thirds of domestic consumption by 2020. INEOS [40] predicts serious consequences for the domestic 
gas market if Europe continues to rely on Russian gas: “the UK will be exposed to shortages and price 
volatility over the next few decades.” While acknowledging uncertainty about scale and commercial 
feasibility, INEOS [40] estimates that a mere 10 percent of the UK’s total reserves would provide 
enough gas for over four decades. And CNR forecasts that inaccessible coal reserves harnessed by 
UCG could produce “enough gas to fuel Britain cheaply and efficiently for hundreds of years” 
(Courier, 22 August 2013). 
 
 
(3) Reassurance 
The need for reassurance has become increasingly evident in the face of determined opposition to 
UGD [7]. The storyline emphasises the value of public consultation to obtain the necessary ‘social 
licence’ for UGD (e.g. [40]). For INEOS, consultation proceeds through a series of public exhibitions 
and community meetings, while online information leaflets and video clips engage in public relations 
and science communication (Interview B). 
 
A core discursive strand plays down the novelty of unconventional gas technologies [39]. UKOOG [70] 
draws attention to the UK’s first instances of fracking in the 1960s and estimates that 10 percent of 
the country’s 2,000 onshore wells have been hydraulically fractured. CNR (2015a) points to a 
domestic UCG project in the 1950s and substantial government-funded research since the late 1990s. 
A second step is to emphasise the specificity of Scottish geology and the UK’s robust regulatory 
framework. INEOS [41] points to “rare instances” of pollution events in the US caused by “poor 
practice and inadequate regulation” and insists that these issues would be “straightforward to avoid 
in the UK.” The company’s information leaflets methodically summarise some of the scientific 
literature and highlight broadly supportive reports written by authoritative organisations (e.g. [67]). 
CNR maintains that there are “no inherent risks” associated with UCG and that any comparison to 
major problems observed in Australia can be discounted due to geological reasons (eight times 
deeper coal seams in Scotland) and greater regulatory stringency (CNR 2015a; Courier, 25 March 
2015; The National, 17 August 2015). 
 
To boost the storyline’s credibility, industry actors recognise that UGD is not a completely risk-free 
enterprise. INEOS [41] maintains that “the risks are manageable and comparable to other practices”. 
CNR speaks of “negligible risk” and proposes to “proceed in a cautious manner with a small pilot 
operation with rigorous oversight” (Falkirk Herald, 2 March 2015). Thus, the discourse of reassurance 
is combined with a science-based, gradual method that fits well with the Scottish government’s 
evidence-based approach. 
 
 
(4) Social and environmental responsibility 
This storyline emphasises that UGD is not merely beneficial for companies, workers, and local 
communities, but also represents an ethically sound endeavour. Moreover, it responds to the 
powerful counter-narrative of a renewables-driven energy transition. 
 
First, natural gas is rehabilitated as a cleaner fossil fuel and as a ‘bridge’ to a low-carbon world. INEOS 
[40] argues that it will “take a couple of decades […] to fully transform how the UK generates 
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electricity and heat.” The Scottish Conservatives point to the US where greater reliance on natural 
gas has enabled marked reductions in carbon emissions ([58]: 30632) and INEOS [40] invokes an 
“environmental duty to use gas rather than coal.” CNR hails offshore ‘clean coal’ UCG projects and 
claims that they would deliver substantial climate mitigation benefits through carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) technology [55]. Such projects could also “help pay for renewable technologies through 
their infancy” [54]. 
 
Second, the storyline invokes an ethical responsibility for society’s energy choices. As the trade union 
GMB Scotland [32] argues, “[t]he issue for Scotland isn’t […] whether we will use gas or not. […] The 
real issue is where we will get our gas from, and who should take the moral responsibility for 
extracting and supplying the gas we use.” This assessment highlights the social and environmental 
advantages of extracting unconventional gas in a regulatory context with stringent rules, regular 
monitoring, adequate salaries, extensive workers’ rights, and benefits for local communities. 
 
Third, the anti-UGD vision of a speedy transition to an entirely renewables-powered energy system is 
called into question. INEOS [40] warns that, by 2020, renewables will only account for 31 percent of 
UK electricity and natural gas still for 29 percent; that 100 percent renewable electricity would 
require a total of 200,000 wind turbines; that the intermittency of renewables would lead to “power 
cuts, blackouts and shortages”; and that electric heating would cost three times as much as gas-
powered central heating. 
 
Anti-UGD groups are rarely addressed directly, but the Scientific Alliance Scotland accuses them of a 
‘knowledge deficit’ and of harbouring irrational fears (Scotsman, 2 March 2015). A second line of 
attack questions the legitimacy of activists. CNR’s Andrew Nunn describes local opponents as 
“increasingly extreme groups [who] oppose practically all forms of energy development in Scotland 
and do not represent the vast majority of the population” [3]. 
 
 
Anti-UGD Storylines 
 
Similarly vigorous criticisms are voiced by the anti-UGD discourse coalition. These actors interpret 
the Scottish government’s ‘evidence-based’ approach as an appeal to the precautionary principle 
(Interviews A, F) whereby potentially risky activities should be prevented “until society can be certain 
that harm will not arise from the process or […] is outweighed by the benefits”  ([22]: 578). The 
overall narrative is best summarised by Friends of the Earth Scotland’s (FOES 2015d) indictment of 
unconventional gas as “unsafe, unnecessary, unwanted.”  
 
(1) Uncertainty and potential risks 
Descriptions of potential risks to public health and the environment are underpinned by excerpts 
from scientific studies and by evocative metaphors. A leaflet by the local group ‘Falkirk Against 
Unconventional Gas’ (FAUG 2015) refers to the prospect of a “toxic nightmare” caused by substances 
contained in rock formations, in shale gas itself, and in fracking fluids – such as radioactive matter, 
radon gas, heavy metals, and airborne chemicals. Examples of incidents from the US and Australia 
are highlighted to demonstrate the existence of serious hazards (The National, 17 August 2015), and 
the UK’s own experience with UGD is portrayed as a “catalogue of problems” (FOES 2015c). UCG 
technology is described as “largely untested” and “experimental” (Courier, 14 February 2015; Falkirk 
Herald, 2 March 2015). 
 
Although concerns over the degradation of landscapes and amenities are sometimes voiced, anti-
UGD groups seek to insulate themselves from the charge of not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY), largely self-
interested opposition by articulating several other storylines. They also point to opinion polls 
showing that a majority of Scottish citizens oppose UGD [76,65,77]. 
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(2) ‘Bad governance’ and energy justice 
Place-based opposition – for instance against CBM and shale gas (around Falkirk) or against UCG (in 
Fife and Edinburgh) – is a key feature of anti-UGD mobilisation. Bomberg ([7]: 11) speaks of growing 
concerns across the UK over ‘bad governance’ and a planning process beset by a “lack of 
transparency, democracy, and citizen input.” Scottish activists criticise the planning system for not 
acting as a “fair arbitrator”, for not giving sufficient space to major objections (climate change, public 
health), and for allowing developers to operate below the radar by pressing ahead with exploratory 
drilling [78]. The moratorium is considered to be incomplete because it allows for baseline 
monitoring and test drilling. 
 
Anti-UGD mobilisation can partly be understood as a demand for ‘energy justice’ [44], particularly for 
stronger procedural safeguards [17] that give local councils and citizens more influence. Thus, there 
are often ethical objections to centralised decision-making and the dominance of narrowly conceived 
scientific and economic considerations ([16,22], Interview I). Several community councils around 
Falkirk drafted a comprehensive ‘Community Charter’ to transform “the narrative of ‘fighting against’ 
into ‘fighting for’” [79]. The charter invokes the protection of ‘cultural heritage’, commits the 
signatories to “truly Sustainable Development”, and lists a broad range of environmental, socio-
economic, and cultural goals [24]. This represents a dual riposte to (1) critiques of ‘NIMBY’ 
preoccupation with traffic congestion, local amenities, and property prices; and (2) the legal and 
administrative strictures of the planning system. It also taps into the ongoing debate over land 
reform, democratic governance, and community ownership in Scotland [78]. 
 
 
(3) Threat to low-carbon energy transition 
A key storyline depicts UGD as undermining Scotland’s climate change targets and the renewable 
energy transition. UGD generates additional fugitive emissions of methane that may cancel out some 
of its climate change related advantages over coal [30]. Highlighting reports by the UK Parliamentary 
Committee on Climate Change, opponents underline the limited duration of a natural gas ‘bridge’ to 
a fully decarbonised energy system. Assuming that environmental and health impact assessments 
will have to be carried out for many years to come, FOES [29] concludes that unconventional gas will 
by that point have missed its brief window of opportunity as a lower-carbon fossil fuel. The planned 
“dash for unconventional gas” is billed as a “serious distraction from badly needed investment in 
clean renewable energy” [31]. 
 
The thrust of this storyline is to portray unconventional fossil fuels as both wrong-headed and 
unnecessary. Regarding a potential coal gasification power plant (with CCS) at Grangemouth, Richard 
Dixon of FOES argues that “[a] carbon capture facility is perhaps useful in somewhere like China […], 
but here in Scotland, where renewables are the single biggest source of energy and increasing all the 
time, we really don't need one” (Times, 28 March 2015). The pro-renewables narrative is firmly in 
place and it is backed up by opinion polls showing considerable support for renewable energy (e.g. 
[77]). However, the anti-UGD discourse coalition still has to respond to influential pro-UGD storylines 
about energy security and economic development. 
 
 
(4) Energy security 
Taking Scotland’s ambitious climate and energy targets for granted allows the critics to question UGD 
as a major contribution to energy security. According to FOES [30], it may take a decade for 
significant onshore gas production to come on stream, and recovery rates could be lower than 
anticipated. Today’s investments may even become ‘stranded assets’ by the late 2040s, once very 
stringent climate targets loom on the horizon [56]. 
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FOES [30] conclude that “the real solution for energy security and a sustainable economy is 
renewable power and energy efficiency.” Given Scotland’s potential for renewable energy, there is 
much stronger emphasis on the former. In the wider UK context, however, Friends of the Earth have 
also made a case for energy efficiency, demand reduction, and diversification of natural gas imports 
as an alternative strategy for ensuring energy security [27]. 
 
 
(5) Economic development 
Finally, the prospect of significant economic benefits through UGD is called into question by anti-
UGD actors. FOES juxtapose relatively short-term job opportunities with long-term risks from drilling. 
The group argues that there would be relatively few ‘itinerant’ workers at each drilling site and that 
jobs may be lost in other sectors, such as tourism and the food and drink industry [28]. The aggregate 
economic benefits promised by INEOS are questioned on technical grounds (assuming high 
production rates per well or many wells per square mile) and on moral grounds because some 
compensation to landowners would already be legally required [28]. 
 
By contrast, substantial job creation is claimed as one major benefit of the alternative strategy based 
on energy efficiency and renewable energy. A report commissioned by the Scottish Greens lays out 
the transition to a low-carbon economy by 2035, promising an overall gain in employment in sectors 
such as renewable energy, forestry, and building retrofitting [49]. Employees at INEOS’ Grangemouth 
site – who would be adversely affected by this economic shift – are promised 15 years of job security 
thanks to shale gas deliveries from the US, followed by a “just transition for workers” [28]. 
 
 
Explaining the Evolution of the Debate 
 
One way to explain the evolution of the debate over UGD (and associated policy-making) is to assess 
the relative discursive power of pro- and anti-UGD discourse coalitions, as Bomberg [7] has done for 
the UK. In Scotland, the different storylines cover an expansive discursive terrain and opinion polls 
indicate that anti-UGD narratives currently appear to outperform pro-UGD storylines. Table 2 
suggests some resonant linkages, but this assessment remains tentative. Instead, the focus in this 
final section lies on explaining discursive shifts which have already taken place, specifically in relation 
to the pivotal role played by the Scottish government. Torn between growing public scepticism and 
potential economic opportunities, the Scottish government has long avoided taking a clear position. 
Its dual discursive strategy has further complicated matters. 
 
The Scottish government can, in effect, be conceptualised as a separate, third discourse coalition 
whose ‘evidence-based approach’ to UGD has achieved discourse structuration and a considerable 
degree of discursive dominance. There are other undecided actors in this grouping which have not 
yet taken a firm position on UGD, such as the National Farmers’ Union Scotland and the Church of 
Scotland. But it is appropriate to focus on the Scottish government as the undisputed discursive 
leader. 
 
 
The Evidence-Based Approach 
 
For the governing SNP, an extensive regulatory pause for gathering evidence has delivered strategic 
benefits. It has minimised electoral risk by ensuring that no decision would be taken before the UK 
General Election (May 2015) and the Scottish Parliament Election (May 2016) (Interviews H, I). This 
astute political manoeuvre has been underpinned by a discursive appeal to the government’s 
competency and to the wisdom of proceeding on the basis of robust scientific evidence. Competent 
governance is affirmed by invoking a ‘responsible’, ‘moderate’, ‘careful’, and ‘considered’ approach. 
This is contrasted with strong pro- or anti-UGD stances taken by other political parties. Energy 
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Minister Ewing declared that “[u]nlike the Conservatives […] and the Labour Party, we take a sensible 
approach: we look for the evidence”. He then demanded: “What could conceivably be wrong with 
that approach?” ([59]: 3). 
 
Stakeholder and public consultations are an integral part of the government’s approach. They are in 
line with its general tendency to make policy “through consultation, to gather evidence, seek 
consensus when it is there, and (when possible or appropriate) ‘co-produce’ policy with a wide range 
of people and organisations” [10]. Given the divisiveness of the UGD debate, genuine co-production 
may prove impossible. But the government has stressed that the moratorium has been welcomed by 
both industry and environmental NGOs (Scotsman, 10 March 2015). In addition to broad-based 
acceptance, the discursive dominance of the evidence-based approach has partly been achieved by 
sheer overwhelming repetition. As The Herald (4 March 2016) observes, any challenge to the 
government’s policy on UGD is immediately parried by “trotting out” its “mantra” on evidence-based 
policy-making. Among the media sources analysed for this research, references to the evidence-
based approach are almost always present. 
 
Moreover, the flexible nature of this storyline should be noted. First articulated in February 2014 to 
legitimise a more cautious planning policy, by January 2015 it had become the overarching rationale 
for a moratorium. While pro-UGD actors often refer to a ‘science-based approach’ (Herald, 15 
October 2015) and point to a supportive report by an expert scientific panel [57], anti-UGD actors 
employ the evidence-based approach to demand stringent precaution and, thus, a permanent ban 
(Interviews A, F, H). The government insists on a programme of evidence gathering, but also seeks to 
preserve its political leeway. Energy minister Ewing has called for a national debate informed by 
evidence, rational analysis, and a better understanding of public opinion [2]. This signifies an 
incipient shift towards a more flexible interpretation of the evidence-based approach and 
corresponds to an increasingly critical mood in the governing SNP. Barely a year after announcing the 
moratorium, the party’s manifesto for the 2016 Scottish parliament elections went so far as to 
declare “deep scepticism” about UGD and vowed to block it unless it can be proven “beyond any 
doubt that there is no risk to health, communities or the environment” ([63]: 31). The main reason 
for the gradual drift from balanced evidence-based language towards a discourse of precaution is the 
strong resonance of a second, anti-Westminster storyline. 
 
 
The Fulcrum of Scottish Nationalism 
 
Scotland’s political scene in 2013 and 2014 was dominated by the independence referendum. Yet, in 
making the economic case for independence, the SNP’s campaign emphasised renewable energy and 
the offshore oil industry, while largely ignoring the potential of UGD (Scotsman, 10 October 2013). 
Just one month before the referendum, and responding to the UK government’s plans to allow 
drilling under private land (below 300m) without consent, the SNP began to emphasise the 
distinctiveness of the Scottish government’s position. Energy minister Ewing linked the issue to the 
emotive topic of land ownership and contrasted Scotland’s “evidence-based, cautious and 
considered approach” with the UK government’s “gung-ho approach”. Instead, he argued, decisions 
on UGD should be taken by the people of Scotland. A ‘yes’ vote in the referendum would make this 
possible (Herald, 16 August 2014). This position became an integral part of the SNP’s discourse after 
the referendum. A further transfer of UGD-related powers was agreed by the Smith Commission 
(2014), albeit not including UGD-related tax revenues. The UK’s approach was regularly criticised, 
and the Scottish government unsuccessfully tried to justify its inaction on UCG (until October 2015) 
with relevant powers remaining with the UK government and the Coal Authority [3]. 
 
Once unleashed, the anti-Westminster and pro-independence storyline could not be politically 
contained in the way intended by the Scottish government. During the two election campaigns of 
2015 and 2016, SNP supporters wore specially designed badges showing the party logo and the 
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slogan ‘Frack Off’. According to the SNP leadership, this signified that “fracking is off the agenda in 
Scotland” (Herald, 12 April 2016), but the slogan exactly mirrors the language used by anti-UGD 
campaigners. Pro-UGD actors responded with narratives of opportunity to frame UGD as a pathway 
to future independence, especially in a context of a declining oil price and flagging offshore 
operations. Tom Pickering of INEOS called UGD a “once-in-a-generation opportunity” (Herald, 14 
October 2015), while the company’s CEO Jim Ratcliffe hailed it as the “last chance to gain economic 
independence” [61]. He stoked the deep-running nationalist rivalry with England by warning that “[i]t 
would be a tragedy for Scotland if England ends up taking the lead in this exciting industry, and 
secures the jobs and investments” (Scottish Sun, 16 October 2015). 
 
Despite their potential, these attempts of linking UGD with Scottish independence have not yet had a 
significant impact on public opinion or the SNP’s position. The SNP did not merely have to contend 
with a surging Green party, but more importantly faced considerable internal divisions. With many 
SNP candidates campaigning locally against UGD, the issue was said to have even “more traction” 
among the party membership than the quest for a second independence referendum (Sunday 
Herald, 4 October 2015). The SNP leadership only narrowly avoided a motion on banning UGD at the 
2015 Autumn party conference by toning it down significantly. Despite multiple motions, the topic 
was entirely excluded from the subsequent Spring conference (Scotsman, 23 January 2016). An 
internal anti-UGD group (SMAUG) was set up in September 2015 to mobilise and channel political 
pressure. The context for this has been auspicious, as SNP voters emerge as by far the most sceptical 
about UGD among the three main parties, with almost three quarters of them against prioritising the 
new technology [77]. 
 
Torrance [69] concludes that “a deep aversion to fracking has entered the soul of the party.” At the 
2015 Autumn party conference, SMAUG member Iain Black transformed the party’s battle cry about 
‘Scotland’s oil’ into a plea for protecting communities from adverse impacts: “now it's Scotland's 
land, it's Scotland's air, it's Scotland's water” (ibid.). UGD could have (and might still) become part of 
a revamped economic case for independence, but in the minds of many it has been “cast as 
‘Unionist’ and therefore bad” (The Herald, 18 April 2016). To a significant extent, the combined 
impact of the anti-Westminster storyline and the five anti-UGD storylines has served to construct the 
technology as risky and undesirable, thus motivating an increasingly sceptical stance by the Scottish 
government. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has applied key concepts of ADA to unconventional gas in Scotland. Given the paucity of 
case-specific secondary academic literature, I have provided a detailed analysis of the main storylines 
used by pro- and anti-UGD discourse coalitions. ADA emphasises the dynamic nature of policy 
debates through which ideas, values, trust, and credibility can help to challenge and redefine a given 
set of interests. Carefully constructed storylines can be key tools of persuasion and begin to shift the 
balance both in the public debate and potentially in the policy process.  
 
Both anti- and pro-UGD storylines have gained significant potency over the last few years. Some 
storylines primarily appeal to citizens’ economic interests, but others are highly attuned to matters 
of trust and justice or seek to boost experiential commensurability and cultural resonance. Economy-
related storylines are overrepresented in the pro-UGD camp, while anti-UGD storylines cover a 
broader spectrum of resonant discourses. 
 
The article’s second main contribution is an interpretive assessment of discursive and political 
dynamics thus far. While anti-UGD actors have sought to politicise the issue of UGD since 2011, its 
level of political salience was significantly boosted by the Scottish government’s (and the SNP’s) 
decision to appropriate it for the Scottish independence campaign in 2014. The Scottish government 
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is the evident linchpin in these developments – not merely due to this decision but also because it 
has managed to both structure the debate and temporarily institutionalise its preferred policy, 
namely the moratorium on all forms of UGD. Of particular importance is the discursive dominance of 
the government’s ‘evidence-based approach’. Embodied by the moratorium and invoking the 
authority of scientific knowledge, this strategy has attracted qualified support from the other 
discourse coalitions. But it has fallen short of discursive hegemony due to its avowedly temporary 
nature and the contradictory effects of the government’s discursive strategy. 
 
In principle, the government has retained considerable political leeway by acting as the gatekeeper 
with respect to what counts as sound evidence, what constitutes (un)acceptable risk, and how to 
organise the planned public consultation. But once the symbolic and discursive power of the anti-
Westminster storyline had been unleashed, it became difficult to contain. Political contestation 
continued to grow and the government’s position was undermined by grassroots mobilisation in the 
SNP itself. Originally intended to work in combination with the anti-Westminster storyline, the 
evidence-based approach/storyline has at times been overshadowed by it. Overall, one can thus 
observe a discursive ‘drift’ from the construction of UGD as a relatively low-key issue (covered by a 
modestly reformed planning system) to increasing politicisation (prompting the moratorium) and, 
ultimately, the emergence of a precautionary narrative.  
 
Similar dynamics of delay, evidence gathering, and eventual precautionary decisions can be observed 
in the Netherlands and New York State [46,51,47] – which have instituted medium-term or indefinite 
moratoria – and they might serve as scenarios for predicting Scotland’s regulatory trajectory. In turn, 
the Scottish experience may also hold lessons for UGD controversies in other countries. Besides the 
credibility and appeal of economic storylines in favour of UGD, non-economic or composite storylines 
may turn out to be crucial for the discursive (and political) power of anti-UGD groups. The existence 
of plausible alternative energy visions (particularly renewables) as well as the framing of industrial 
history (related to fossil fuel extraction) and its legacy may constitute key explanatory variables. 
Furthermore, discursive linkages with resonant governance- or identity-related debates – for 
instance, over Scottish independence or land reform – can provide considerable and lasting political 
salience. These factors deserve further analysis in the emerging comparative literature on UGD. 
 
In the Scottish case, a strengthening of pro-UGD storylines and future shifts in public opinion remain 
a possibility and might be caused by exogenous factors, such as rapidly rising energy prices, 
economic downturns, or technological innovations that offer enhanced safety, lower costs, or 
climate mitigation benefits (e.g. propane-based fracking or carbon capture and storage). The UK 
Government’s decision to phase out feed-in tariffs for onshore wind farms by April 2016 and its 
promise to set up a shale wealth fund (including payments to individual local householders) have also 
shifted incentives in favour of UGD. The UK’s referendum on leaving the European Union (June 2016) 
and the possible prospect of a second Scottish independence referendum may equally affect public 
opinion and policy-making in yet unforeseen ways. Currently, however, the Scottish government’s 
precautionary discourse and the Scottish Parliament’s recent non-binding vote for a complete ban on 
UGD (Scotsman, 5 June 2016) indicate that the evidence-based approach could eventually result in 
an extended or indefinite moratorium. Whichever decision transpires, the long-term future of UGD in 
Scotland will undoubtedly be shaped by discursive battles fought with compelling and resonant 
storylines. 
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